After President Barack Obama took office, the administration's initial policy toward North Korea was to achieve "a complete and verifiable denuclearization." However since North Korea executed the second nuclear test last May, the administration has added a word, "irreversible" to the term. The term, "complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID)," had popularly been coined by the former President Bush. But those quickly disappeared because of North Korea's fierce opposition against usage of the terms applied unto its nation. The North stresses such coinage suits to describe a defeated nation. Consecutive to the earlier administration, reemergence of the term 'CVID' implies that Obama administration is following the policy of the former cabinet, regardless of the growing criticism for its precedent diplomatic failure.

There are understandable reason why the administration brought out the term "irreversible" again. North Korea once promised to shutdown the nuclear facilities according to the 1994 Agreed Framework. But in 2003 North Korea resumed the production of weapons-grade plutonium and conducted a nuclear test in October 2006. Agreements signed at the six-power conference in February 13 and October 3 2007 momentarily attained to stop the North Korean nuclear facilities from producing additional plutonium. However again, North Korea resumed to run the nuclear facilities and executed the second nuclear bomb test in last May.

It is a matter of course that the Obama administration is getting frustrated at the North Korea's whimsical behavior. In order to mark a period to ongoing pattern of North Korea's nuclear blackmailing, "irreversible denuclearization" appears to be a sound and consequential strategy for the administration's to deal with the North.

However, in order to achieve a denuclearization of North Korea, it should be admitted that US also has been very "reversible" to carry out the conditions of the agreements. Since the Agreed Framework has been in effect, US has expected to see a fall of the North Korean regime, rather than to fulfill the promises in the agreements. In 2000 US-North Korea Joint Communique, the missile negotiation almost reached a settlement. But the newly started Bush administration canceled negotiation, and pointed out North Korea as "Axis of Evil" and a preemptive strike target. All these happened prior to the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002.

Recent situation appears to be very similar to what happened back in Bush era. Both US and South Korea addressed to commit troops into North Korea in case of emergency, concerning the bad health condition of Kim Jung Il. However, this idea is a complete violation of September Joint Statement condition: "US has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons." Also the UN security council's decision to condemn North Korea to launch satellite for peaceful purpose violates the "spirit of mutual equality and respect," according to the agreement.

Just as US feels despair from North Korea's fickle pattern of diplomacy, North Korea is very frustrated by the unreliable US behavior. Consequently, North Korea has treated its nuclear weapon program in three ways: a diplomatic card to make US to withdraw any hostile policy toward North Korea, an actual deterrent in case of a rupture of negotiation, and finally as a lever to enforce US to carry out the agreement.

When US accomplishes a denuclearization of North Korea, North Korea would lose its sheet anchor to coerce US to fulfill the agreement. This is where an asymmetry lies between the US-North Korea relationship. Once North Korea denuclearize itself, the consequence will be hardly reversible. But for US, it is easy to change the policy toward the denuclearized North Korea. The history proves that international relation does not work based on faithful agreement, rather it is largely determined by a national interest. In regard of peace agreement, the same principle has been applied in many cases.

Such reality tells the hardship of a complete solution for the North Korean nuclear crisis. Also it implies that not only US, but also the international community need to assure irreversible support to the North Korea in turn of its denuclearization. However whether it is a normalization of the relationship, a conclusion of peace treaty, or a massive aid to North Korea, the core principle of these measures cannot be irreversible, fundamentally.

Thus, US must be creative and bold to remove the discrepant measures between the different interest of the nations. First of all, discordance between the words and actions must stand corrected. US should fulfill the agreement faithfully, and contain itself from going astray. It means if one says neither to attack North Korea nor to treat in discriminatory manner, the one should neither address "Contingency Plan" nor to prohibit North Korea to launch the satellite for peaceful purpose. The missile negotiations in the Clinton administration tells us that there is the way to resolve the dilemma between North Korea's ballistic missiles and its demand of satellite.

Second, US should abolish its hostile policy toward North Korea and present a physical evidence to keep pace with the North Korea's denuclearization effort. In other words, US could restart the construction of a light-water nuclear reactor and take steps to reduce or abolish the large scale US-South Korea military exercise.

Lastly, but not least, US and North Korea need to build a solid trust between top level officials. Considering the peculiar structure of North Korea, an asymmetry between the denuclearization and corresponding measures can be mollified through a communication between the top leaders; exact reason why Mr. Obama must arrange a meeting with Kim Jung Il in an appropriate time.

* Wooksik Cheong, the Representative of Peace Network. HongKyung Ko, Peace Network Intern, contributed to translation Korean into English.