 |
||||||||
|
Summary Cheong Wooksik: Where is ROK-US alliance going?
Part1: Changing alliance
A lot of changes in the alliance these last years:
- Dec 2002: Future ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiatives (FOTA), Kim DJ - Bush
- May 2003: “Modernize alliance”, Roh Moo Hyun – Bush
- Oct 2004: Land Partnership plan (LLP), relocation US military bases
- Nov 2005: Gyeongju summit, Joint Declaration on ROK-US alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula (alliance of values).
- Jan 2006: Strategic flexibility of USFK, Roh Moo Hyun – Bush
Strategic flexibility: US forces can execute a variety of missions from preventive, or preemptive military operation against North Korea, to contain China by US’s forces flow-in, flow-out and flow-through Korea.
Three aspects of nature and direction of ROK-US alliance:
1. in addition to the traditional defensive alliance which focused on deterring the North’s invasion (ROK focus role, SK taking care of its own defense), now alliance expands to offensive alliance, which includes preemptive use of force against NK (new role of US: preventing NK from owning and proliferating WMD)
2. From bilateral to regional alliance. US strengthens its role in Asia also because its strategy to prevent China of having too much influence.
3. US trying to spread American values
@the center of these changes: Bush’s military build up (new military strategy). Considering this, Korea needs to think about cost-benefits of its alliance. Cost will outweigh benefits (tentative concl)
Part2: Cost-benefit of alliance
Benefits of Alliance:
1. For the threat of NK which has not disappeared yet, although it diminished.
2. It would cost a lot to replace the military power of USFK (around 14billion USD)
3. Stabilizing effect of economy. However this is a psychological factor, so can be handled easy
4. ROK might turn into a battle zone for hegemony among powerful states (China-Japan armsrace) however: this arms build-up between China and Japan is already present
5. Pro-alliance supporters find the ROK-US alliance a good way to secure sea passages and to use in territorial issues. (a little too far-fetched)
6. Keeping alliance is a way to guarantee peninsula’s security during the reunification process and afterwards. BUT: assumption that Washington really favors reunification and peace on the peninsula has yet to be tested.
Conclusion: ROK-US stabilizing? (yes, but at same time also destabilizing factor in itself)
Cost of Alliance:
1. US realignment to answer to ‘new threats’. So an increasing security threat. (eg. Iraq-inviting security threats)
2. About the financial costs: SK’s share in USFK has been dramatically increasing, will get even more than if we would pay ourselves.
3. Invisible cost: psychological consequence for Korean military and Korean elite groups (irrational reliance on US).
4. SK limited in exploring other avenues of security planning (opportunity cost of the ROK-US alliance), in defense as well as in diplomacy.
Part 3: South Korea should consider an alternative of the alliance. A South Korean progressive’s perspective about alliance.
Even though the alliance has many costs, the question remains what would happen in case the alliance pact is revoked?
How to cease the alliance
A friendly breakup versus a hostile breakup: while a friendly breakup can be more of a gain, a hostile one can be a very destructive one. But whoever will start to recall the alliance, ROK or USA, it will be more likely a hostile breakup restraining US-Korea relations and posing even more damaging problems.
Considerations on the security environment when the alliance ceases to exist
If the North Korean standoff is still unfolding:
- Difficult for South Korea to moderate the US ultra-hardline policy against North Korea, including possible military actions
- North Korea might interpret the US troop withdrawal from South Korea as a sign of imminent US attacks
- A hostile split would make Washington more reluctant in participating in establishing a peace regime on the peninsula, including normalization of relations and signing of a peace treaty with North Korea.
→ The removal of American military from South Korea might heighten the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.
A friendly breakup with the conclusion of the North Korean issue is thus the best way. So, to resolve Seoul’s dilemma, the nuke issue of North Korea should be resolved as soon as possible.
Will Washington seek a divorce from Seoul?
SK goals are: keep the American reliance, while reducing tension in EA and at the same time including NK’s nuke standoff at the least cost. So needed: blueprint of what we want from the ROK-US alliance and diplomatic leverage to realize that blueprint.
This is difficult because of:
- Korean elites with excessive fear of being without US
- Possibility that US change scenario if its demands are not met and thus selffulfilling the fear of Korean elites.
But as long as SK shows such excessive fear to be without the Americans, we will be powerless at the negotiating table.
From the former, we ask the hypothetical question of whether Washington will seek a divorce from Seoul if the latter behaves more demandingly than before? Actually for Washington dismantling the alliance may lead to a considerable strategic loss and confusion, so they are not going to revoke the alliance that fast. Even if the alliance with ROK would change and would not be to US’s wishes, they would still calculate that keeping the alliance would be better than not having one for the following reasons:
1. US important and long-term economic interest in East Asia.
2. Revoking the alliance may lead to closer ROK-China cooperation, which US wants to prevent. Cheong Wooksik argues that at the center of American hegemony the desire lies to block China from forming alliances with other powerful nations or middle power states.
3. Nullification of ROK-US alliance, may have negative effect on its relation with Japan
4. US wants to prevent ROK from obtaining a nuclear weapon and being physically there is one of the best ways to do that
5. Losing ROK-US alliance can lead to the loss of one of Americas prime arms markets.
For all these reasons, US will not abandon the alliance just like that, so Seoul has some negotiation advantage in its dealings with Washington in reforming the alliance.
What is the supreme national interest? deciding factor in Seoul’s consideration of whether to keep the ROK-US alliance or not)
The primary focus of Seoul at this time is to improve the situation where South Korea, as an ally to the US, merely functions as American rubber stamp, while bearing considerable cost to keep the defense alliance. So the first step can be to renegotiate the terms in the relocation of US troops and the strategic flexibility.
But in case of military clash between US and China over Taiwan or of bombing North Korea, the South Korean national interest is to not endanger the existence of the nation. And in case, the peninsula becomes a battlefield, that is just what might happen (“the total destruction of the state”), so then we should be ready to demand to cancel the ROK-US alliance first, not to become involved in a dispute which would threaten SK’s existence.
As an alternative, we should consider actively “non-alliance pacifism” for our future strategic alternative. When we study or prepare such an alternative we will be more flexible and ready when a ROK-US alliance would become nullified even if it comes at an unexpected time.
Part1: Changing alliance
A lot of changes in the alliance these last years:
- Dec 2002: Future ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiatives (FOTA), Kim DJ - Bush
- May 2003: “Modernize alliance”, Roh Moo Hyun – Bush
- Oct 2004: Land Partnership plan (LLP), relocation US military bases
- Nov 2005: Gyeongju summit, Joint Declaration on ROK-US alliance and Peace on the Korean Peninsula (alliance of values).
- Jan 2006: Strategic flexibility of USFK, Roh Moo Hyun – Bush
Strategic flexibility: US forces can execute a variety of missions from preventive, or preemptive military operation against North Korea, to contain China by US’s forces flow-in, flow-out and flow-through Korea.
Three aspects of nature and direction of ROK-US alliance:
1. in addition to the traditional defensive alliance which focused on deterring the North’s invasion (ROK focus role, SK taking care of its own defense), now alliance expands to offensive alliance, which includes preemptive use of force against NK (new role of US: preventing NK from owning and proliferating WMD)
2. From bilateral to regional alliance. US strengthens its role in Asia also because its strategy to prevent China of having too much influence.
3. US trying to spread American values
@the center of these changes: Bush’s military build up (new military strategy). Considering this, Korea needs to think about cost-benefits of its alliance. Cost will outweigh benefits (tentative concl)
Part2: Cost-benefit of alliance
Benefits of Alliance:
1. For the threat of NK which has not disappeared yet, although it diminished.
2. It would cost a lot to replace the military power of USFK (around 14billion USD)
3. Stabilizing effect of economy. However this is a psychological factor, so can be handled easy
4. ROK might turn into a battle zone for hegemony among powerful states (China-Japan armsrace) however: this arms build-up between China and Japan is already present
5. Pro-alliance supporters find the ROK-US alliance a good way to secure sea passages and to use in territorial issues. (a little too far-fetched)
6. Keeping alliance is a way to guarantee peninsula’s security during the reunification process and afterwards. BUT: assumption that Washington really favors reunification and peace on the peninsula has yet to be tested.
Conclusion: ROK-US stabilizing? (yes, but at same time also destabilizing factor in itself)
Cost of Alliance:
1. US realignment to answer to ‘new threats’. So an increasing security threat. (eg. Iraq-inviting security threats)
2. About the financial costs: SK’s share in USFK has been dramatically increasing, will get even more than if we would pay ourselves.
3. Invisible cost: psychological consequence for Korean military and Korean elite groups (irrational reliance on US).
4. SK limited in exploring other avenues of security planning (opportunity cost of the ROK-US alliance), in defense as well as in diplomacy.
Part 3: South Korea should consider an alternative of the alliance. A South Korean progressive’s perspective about alliance.
Even though the alliance has many costs, the question remains what would happen in case the alliance pact is revoked?
How to cease the alliance
A friendly breakup versus a hostile breakup: while a friendly breakup can be more of a gain, a hostile one can be a very destructive one. But whoever will start to recall the alliance, ROK or USA, it will be more likely a hostile breakup restraining US-Korea relations and posing even more damaging problems.
Considerations on the security environment when the alliance ceases to exist
If the North Korean standoff is still unfolding:
- Difficult for South Korea to moderate the US ultra-hardline policy against North Korea, including possible military actions
- North Korea might interpret the US troop withdrawal from South Korea as a sign of imminent US attacks
- A hostile split would make Washington more reluctant in participating in establishing a peace regime on the peninsula, including normalization of relations and signing of a peace treaty with North Korea.
→ The removal of American military from South Korea might heighten the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.
A friendly breakup with the conclusion of the North Korean issue is thus the best way. So, to resolve Seoul’s dilemma, the nuke issue of North Korea should be resolved as soon as possible.
Will Washington seek a divorce from Seoul?
SK goals are: keep the American reliance, while reducing tension in EA and at the same time including NK’s nuke standoff at the least cost. So needed: blueprint of what we want from the ROK-US alliance and diplomatic leverage to realize that blueprint.
This is difficult because of:
- Korean elites with excessive fear of being without US
- Possibility that US change scenario if its demands are not met and thus selffulfilling the fear of Korean elites.
But as long as SK shows such excessive fear to be without the Americans, we will be powerless at the negotiating table.
From the former, we ask the hypothetical question of whether Washington will seek a divorce from Seoul if the latter behaves more demandingly than before? Actually for Washington dismantling the alliance may lead to a considerable strategic loss and confusion, so they are not going to revoke the alliance that fast. Even if the alliance with ROK would change and would not be to US’s wishes, they would still calculate that keeping the alliance would be better than not having one for the following reasons:
1. US important and long-term economic interest in East Asia.
2. Revoking the alliance may lead to closer ROK-China cooperation, which US wants to prevent. Cheong Wooksik argues that at the center of American hegemony the desire lies to block China from forming alliances with other powerful nations or middle power states.
3. Nullification of ROK-US alliance, may have negative effect on its relation with Japan
4. US wants to prevent ROK from obtaining a nuclear weapon and being physically there is one of the best ways to do that
5. Losing ROK-US alliance can lead to the loss of one of Americas prime arms markets.
For all these reasons, US will not abandon the alliance just like that, so Seoul has some negotiation advantage in its dealings with Washington in reforming the alliance.
What is the supreme national interest? deciding factor in Seoul’s consideration of whether to keep the ROK-US alliance or not)
The primary focus of Seoul at this time is to improve the situation where South Korea, as an ally to the US, merely functions as American rubber stamp, while bearing considerable cost to keep the defense alliance. So the first step can be to renegotiate the terms in the relocation of US troops and the strategic flexibility.
But in case of military clash between US and China over Taiwan or of bombing North Korea, the South Korean national interest is to not endanger the existence of the nation. And in case, the peninsula becomes a battlefield, that is just what might happen (“the total destruction of the state”), so then we should be ready to demand to cancel the ROK-US alliance first, not to become involved in a dispute which would threaten SK’s existence.
As an alternative, we should consider actively “non-alliance pacifism” for our future strategic alternative. When we study or prepare such an alternative we will be more flexible and ready when a ROK-US alliance would become nullified even if it comes at an unexpected time.
